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DECISIONS BY AND FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
RETARDATION: BALANCING CONSIDERATIONS
OF AUTONOMY AND PROTECTION
JAMES

W. ELLIS*

"There's nothing about retarded persons that should
lead us to believe that they think less of their freedom
than do other people."'
Major decisions in the lives of people with mental retardation
generate substantial dilemmas, of both a personal and public policy nature. On the one hand there is the desire to accommodate
the autonomous choices of individuals with disabilities and enhance their ability to make decisions affecting their own lives. On
the other hand, there is also a commonly felt need to protect individuals with substantial mental disabilities from the adverse consequences of potentially unwise, ill-informed or incompetently
made decisions. Each of these two impulses is a fully understandable and reasonable concern, and yet each may be the source of
abuse of persons with disabilities. And of necessity, the implementation of these goals can coexist with one another only in
tension.
No simple formula or reductive ideological perspective can
resolve these dilemmas in a satisfactory manner. The complex
pattern of individual abilities and disabilities, as well as the elements of coerciveness in the structure of the lives of people with
mental retardation make any such simplistic paradigm unacceptable. Furthermore, neither of our goals-enhancing autonomy of
personal decisionmaking and the improvement of services and
life conditions for people with mental retardation-can be pursued single-mindedly at the expense of the other.
* Henry Weihofen Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of
Law. B.A., Occidental College, 1968; J.D., University of California at Berkeley,
1974. The author served as President of the American Association on Mental
Retardation during 1989-90.
This Article is dedicated to the memory of Tim Cook, who was among the
most skilled and thoughtful advocates that people with disabilities have ever
possessed. Tim would probably have disagreed with some of the statements in
this Article, but it would have benefitted greatly from his invariably wise and
generous criticism.
1. BURTON BLATT, THE CONQUEST OF MENTAL RETARDATION 332 (1987).
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This Article will attempt to analyze some of the considerations that should inform enlightened and compassionate public
policy in this area. Section I will describe briefly the definition of
mental retardation and common attributes of people who have
the disability and the social and political world in which they live
within our society. Section II will sketch some of the contexts in
which legal issues about decisionmaking arise in the lives of people with mental retardation. Section III will discuss the generic
legal doctrines of consent which form the backdrop for legal analysis of these problems, with particular attention to the United
States Supreme Court's 1990 decisions concerning the constitutional aspects of consent law. Section IV will discuss these legal
doctrines as they may apply-helpfully or otherwise-in the practical problem situations that people with mental retardation may
confront in their lives.
I.

MENTAL RETARDATION:

DEFINITION AND COMMON

CHARACTERISTICS

A.

The Previous AAMR Definition

Mental retardation is a substantial handicap affecting the individual's ability to learn. The universally accepted definition has
been the one propounded by the American Association on Mental
Retardation (AAMR): "Mental retardation refers to significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently
with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period." 2 The component parts of this definition are
terms of art.
"Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning"
refers to an intellectual disability measurable, and thus defined,
by psychometric instruments known as intelligence tests. The
phenomenon is therefore quantifiable as an IQ (intelligence quotient) score, and the level of performance on such a test that
meets the AAMR definition of mental retardation is at least two
standard deviations below the mean for the general population.
Expressed in terms of IQ scores, that means that a person with
mental retardation must, in ordinary circumstances, score below
seventy on such a test (for which the mean score is one hundred).
Since the definition is expressed in statistical terms, this means
2. AMERICAN ASS'N ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 1 (Herbert J. Grossman ed., 1983) [hereinafter AAMR CLASSIFICATION] (American Association on Mental Deficiency has been renamed American
Association on Mental Retardation).
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that any person who has mental retardation must be in the lowest
two and one-half percent of the population in measured
3
intelligence.
However, for a person to be classified as having mental retardation, it is not enough to have a low IQ score. The AAMR definition also requires that the handicap have some measurable
impact on an individual's ability to function in everyday life. This
is defined in terms of "adaptive behavior," which the AAMR defines as "significant limitations in an individual's effectiveness in
meeting the standards of maturation, learning, personal independence, and/or social responsibility that are expected for his or
her age level and cultural group, as determined by clinical assessment and, usually, standardized scales." ' 4 The core of this requirement is that a person must have an actual disability that
affects everyday life, and not just a lack of test-taking ability.
Finally, the definition requires that this disability have been
manifested "during the developmental period," which means
before the age of eighteen. Therefore, the definition includes individuals who were born with an intellectual disability and those
who acquired one during childhood or adolescence, but it does
not include people whose disability first occurred in adulthood.
The excluded group consists primarily of people whose intellectual abilities are substantially impaired as a result of illness or
5
traumatic injury later in life.
B.

The Revised AAMR Definition

The American Association on Mental Retardation has recently adopted a revised version of its definition.
Mental retardationrefers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently
with related limitations in two or more of the following
applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care,
home living, social skills, community use, self-direction,
3. For a more comprehensive discussion of the definition of mental retardation, see James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 414, 421-23 (1985).

4. AAMR CLASSIFICATION, supra note 2, at 11.
5. Persons whose disabilities occur after the developmental period have
some characteristics in common with people who have mental retardation, but
there are some functional dissimilarities as well. Whether these individuals
should be subject to the same legal rules governing consent as people with
mental retardation is beyond the scope of this Article.
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health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and
work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18.6
The new definition of mental retardation makes no substantial change in the element of "significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning" and the requirement that the disability have manifested itself during the developmental period. The principal
change in the definition is the replacement of the global construct
of "adaptive behavior" with the more realistic and functional construct of requiring that the intellectual impairment be accompanied by related limitations in particular skill areas.
The revised definition of mental retardation constitutes a valuable refinement of our understanding of the disability. It will
focus the attention of educators, clinicians, public policy makers
and other users of the definition on the specific areas of disability
and service needs of individuals.
These changes will create no substantial change in the size or
composition of the group of people classified as having mental
retardation. Since the definitional change will not alter the contours of the group defined, it will not have a substantial impact on
formulating legal rules governing consent by people within the
7
classification.
C.

Relevant Characteristicsof People with Mental Retardation

People with mental retardation are individuals. This central
truth is sometimes lost in our attempts to classify them and categorize their abilities, needs, and behaviors. Therefore, any generalizations about people with mental retardation (or any other
6. AMERICAN ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter
AAMR 1992 CLASSIFICATION].

7. The changes may, however, have an impact on our ability to implement
the legal doctrines on an individualized basis. As the definition shifts focus from
a construct of adaptive behavior, reducible to a single psychometric scale and a
single score, to a more complex and realistic conceptualization of component
disabilities and competencies, the consent-seeking and consent-giving or consent-withholding process may be assisted.
For a discussion of attempts to formulate a psychometric instrument that
would specifically measure the ability of an individual with mental retardation to
participate in decisions about services in his or her own life, see Pam Lindsey &
Ruth A. Luckasson, Consent Screening Interview for Community Residential Placement:
Report on the Initial Pilot Study Data, 29 MENTAL RETARDATION 119 (1991). For
discussion of a parallel effort regarding competence in the criminal justice system, see Caroline T. Everington, The Competence Assessment for Standing Trial for
Defendants with Mental Retardation (CAST-MR): A Validation Study, 17 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV.

147 (1990).
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disability) must be undertaken with great caution, and any wouldbe generalizer must remain mindful that individual differences
will create exceptions to almost any description or characterization. But with these caveats duly noted, there are characteristics
commonly encountered in people with mental retardation that
are either a direct result of their disability or of the way in which
they are treated in society, and those characteristics are relevant
to assessing their ability to make decisions affecting their lives. 8
It is also worth noting the differences between these characteristics and those typically encountered in people with mental
illness. The legal doctrines of consent concerning mental disability are most frequently formulated by courts and legislatures with
mental illness as the paradigm. In some respects, the disabilities
caused by mental illness and mental retardation are sufficiently
similar to warrant identical doctrinal approaches. But in other respects, the differences between mental illness and mental retardation should lead to a reexamination of whether the legal
approaches are adequately tailored to people with mental
retardation.
1. Variation
The first item is less a characteristic of individuals with
mental retardation than an attribute of the class itself. The severity of intellectual impairment within the class of people we label
as having mental retardation varies greatly. It has been observed
that within the class of people who have mental retardation, individuals at the highest level of functioning have less in common
with those at the lowest level of functioning than they have in
common with people who have no intellectual handicap at all. 9
For example, at the upper end of the functional spectrum of
mental retardation, individuals have both expressive and receptive language abilities, i.e. they can both speak intelligibly and understand the speech of others; at the lowest levels, individuals
have neither of these basic communication skills. Similar variation exists in such areas as comprehension and reasoning. These
functional differences will also have occasioned dissimilar kinds of
life experiences and educational opportunities, and these experiential dissimilarities compound the naturally occurring disparities
8. For a discussion of characteristics relevant to the criminal justice system,
see Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 3, at 423-32.
9. H. Carl Haywood, Reaction Comment, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN
AND THE LAW 677 (Michael Kindred et al. eds., 1976).
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in the level or degree of disability.' 0
These variations within the classification of mental retardation are indeed wide, but it is important to keep in mind that they
are variations within a narrowly defined class. All persons who
have mental retardation have a level of intellectual functioning
that places them in the lowest two and one-half percent of the
population. Therefore, although there is great variation in the
level of functioning of people within the classification of mental
retardation, the highest functioning individuals in the class have a
substantial disability.
2.

Deficits in Basic Knowledge

A characteristic commonly encountered in people with
mental retardation that has direct relevance to shaping the rules
of consent is the lack of basic information. These deficits result
from both the intellectual impairment itself and the educational
opportunities that people with mental retardation are given. I I
Obviously, the level of knowledge possessed by people with
mental retardation varies widely, and is closely correlated to the
degree of severity of the individual's disability. But even with rel10. AAMR's previous classification system subdivided the class of people
who have mental retardation into four subcategories, designated "mild," "moderate," "severe," and "profound" mental retardation. AAMR CLASSIFICATION,
supra note 2, at 13. Because the statistically defined phenomenon of mental retardation constitutes the "tail" of the bell-shaped curve of normal distribution of
intelligence, people with mental retardation are not equally distributed among
the four subcategories; approximately 85% of the people who have mental retardation are classified as having "mild" mental retardation. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 32 (3d ed. rev. 1987).
The labels "mild" and "moderate" may lead those unfamiliar with the AAMR
system to underestimate the level of disability of individuals at those levels.
"Judges ... unfamiliar with this classification scheme may find the labels of
'mild' and 'moderate' to be euphemistic descriptions of individuals at those
levels of disability." Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 3, at 423.
The new AAMR definition abandons the approach of classifying people with
mental retardation according to the level of their intellectual impairment. For a
description of the new definition, see supra note 6 and accompanying text. As a
result, the terms "mild," "moderate," "severe" and "profound" mental retardation will no longer be used. In place of this system, the new classification
scheme recognizes differences in the level of support an individual will need in a
particular skill area, and classifies the individual's need as "intermittent," "limited," "extensive" or "pervasive." These classifications are no longer directly
linked to differences in intellectual functioning (as measured by IQ scores) or
overall disability. AAMR 1992 CLASSIFICATION, supra note 6, at 26. Examples of
diagnoses under the new system would be "a person with mental retardation
who needs limited supports in communication and social skills" or "a person
with mental retardation with extensive supports needed in the areas of social
skills and self-direction." Id. at 34.
11. See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 3, at 43 1.
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atively modest impairment within the classification of mental retardation, individuals may not know factual information that
mentally typical people are likely to know.
3.

Communication

Mental retardation is generally accompanied by some level of
disability in the area of communication. The disabled individual
may be limited in receptive communication, expressive communication, or both.' 2 The impairment of the individual's communication skills is generally correlated to the level of disability.
4.

Denial of Disability

Less widely recognized by the general public than deficits in
knowledge, reasoning or communication skills is the tendency of
many people with mental retardation to seek to conceal the fact of
their disability. Because of the stigma that they perceive as accompanying the label of mental retardation,' 3 often people with
the disability will go to great lengths to prevent others from discovering their handicap.' 4 This often precludes them from seeking assistance with matters they do not comprehend, and
prevents others from taking the limitations of their disability into
account in their dealings with people with mental retardation.
5.

Reduced Ability To Make Decisions

Some limitations on the ability of people with mental retardation to make decisions regarding their own lives are an inevitable
consequence of the disability. For example, a person with a severe receptive communication disability or one whose intellectual
limitation prevents them from understanding a particular proposal may be unable to formulate and communicate a reasoned
choice.
But in addition to these naturally occurring limitations in the
12. For a discussion of communication issues in the criminal justice system,
see Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 3, at 428-29.
13. See ROBERT BOGDAN & STEVEN TAYLOR, INSIDE OUT: THE SOCIAL MEANING OF RETARDATION (1982); Robert Bogdan & Steve Taylor, The Judged, Not the
Judges: An Insider's View of Mental Retardation, 31 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 47 (1976);
Andrea G. Zetlin &Jim L. Turner, Self-Perspectives on Being Handicapped:Stigma and
Adjustment, in LIVES IN PROCESS: MILDLY RETARDED ADULTS IN A LARGE CITY 93120 (Robert Edgerton ed., 1984) [herinafter LIVES IN PROCESS].
14. See generally ROBERT EDGERTON, THE CLOAK OF COMPETENCE: STIGMA IN
THE LIVES OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 148 (1967). For discussion of this phenomenon in the criminal justice system, see Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 3, at

430-31.
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lives of some individuals, there is often a reduced ability to make
decisions which is caused by the circumstances under which the
individual has lived. Even for individuals whose natural abilities
to comprehend and communicate would otherwise allow them to
make their own decisions, prolonged and extensive denial of the
opportunity to make such decisions in the past may prevent actual
effective decisionmaking. It may be that the ability to make such
decisions has never been mastered, or that a previous ability has
atrophied over time. This phenomenon is often observed in individuals who have been confined for a significant period of time in
large congregate care facilities,' 5 but may also be found in individuals who have lived in their communities under extremely re6
strictive or over-protective circumstances.'
The combination of naturally occurring and societally created limitations inherent in an individual's ability to make his or
her own decisions will have some correlation with general intellectual functioning,17 but cannot be determined with sufficient accuracy merely by referring to an individual's IQ score.' 8 An
assessment must be made which considers an individual's particular abilities and limitations, the subject matter of the decision proposed, and the context in which the decision is sought. 19
6. Settings in Which People with Mental Retardation Are Asked To
Make Decisions
The residential, familial, legal and socioeconomic contexts in
which people with mental retardation live vary widely. Each of
these factors may influence the amount of perceived coercion in a
particular decisional context. It has been widely recognized that
the coerciveness of an individual's setting may be a determinative
15. See, e.g., Robert F. DeVellis, Learned Helplessness in Institutions, 15 MENTAL
(1977).
16. See generally DARYL P. EVANS, THE LIVES OF MENTALLY RETARDED PEOPLE

RETARDATION 10

(1983); H. RUTHERFORD TURNBULL ET AL., THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE:

PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (1981).
17. For example, a person previously classified as having severe mental retardation would be much more likely to have a substantially impaired ability to
make decisions than a person classified as having mild mental retardation. Classification under the new AAMR system would focus on the difference more precisely, by referring, for example, to the more substantially disabled individual as
needing extensive or pervasive supports in such specific areas as
communication.
18. See Lindsey & Luckasson, supra note 7.
19. See H. RUTHERFORD TURNBULL ET AL., CONSENT HANDBOOK (1977)
[hereinafter CONSENT HANDBOOK].
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0
factor in the legal adequacy of choices he or she may make.2
A considerable number of people who have mental retardation continue to live in large institutional settings. Such congregate care facilities create the most obvious and severe problems
of coerciveness. But an increasing number of people with mental
retardation live in an increasingly complex array of structured
community living arrangements. 2 1 Those arrangements vary
greatly in the degree of restrictiveness that their residents experience. Even within a particular category, such as group homes,
there are substantial variations in style and atmosphere that influence the validity of an individual's consent or refusal. 2 2 Other
individuals with mental retardation reside outside any structured
environment, but may work or pursue other activities in settings
in which they experience varying degrees of restriction and
23
coerciveness.

7.

Permanence

Mental illness is, for many individuals, a sporadic, episodic,
or temporary phenomenon. The same cannot be said about
mental retardation. Intellectual impairment at the level that constitutes mental retardation is not "curable" or "changeable" in
the ordinary sense of those terms. Nevertheless, significant
changes may occur over the life span of a person with mental retardation that are relevant to questions of consent. Adaptive
skills and service needs may change with the changing circumstances of an individual's life, and the result may be that although
the intellectual impairment is the same as it was in an earlier pe20. See, e.g., id.; MICHAEL L. PERLIN, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL 244-51 (1989) [hereinafter MENTAL DISABILITY LAW] (discussing legal
and behavioral theories upon which right to refuse treatment may be premised);
FAY ROZOVKSY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 12-17 (2d ed.
1990) (discussing capacity of individuals with mental retardation to consent to
medical treatment and also discussing their guardians' authority to consent to
such treatment).
The extent to which coercion bears upon an individual's capacity to consent
has been explored in case law as well. The leading case is Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-A.W. (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne Cty.
July 10, 1973) (holding that involuntarily detained mental patient cannot consent to experimental pyschosurgery), reprinted in 2 Prison L. Rptr. 433 (1973).
21. See Bradley K. Hill & K. Charlie Lakin, Classificationof Residential Facilities
for Individuals with Mental Retardation, 24 MENTAL RETARDATION 107 (1986).

22. See generally Mary F. Hayden et al., Placement Practices in Specialized Foster
Homes and Small Group Homes for Persons with Mental Retardation, 30 MENTAL RETARDATION 53 (1992).

23. For a discussion of such settings from an anthropological perspective,
see LIVES IN PROCESS, supra note 13.
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riod, the person no longer falls within the definition of mental
retardation because the impact on'daily functioning is reduced. It
is in this sense (and only this sense) that the AAMR's new classification manual states that "[m]ental retardation begins prior to
'2 4
age 18 but may not be of lifelong duration.
Far more numerous than the persons who no longer fall
within the definition of mental retardation are the individuals who
continue to have mental retardation but whose functional impairment differs significantly over time. For example, an individual in
a successful special education program may be able to understand
and make choices about things that were beyond his or her ability
in an earlier period of life. This is particularly true if the educational or habilitation program is specifically targeted to teaching
that individual the skills or concepts that are directly relevant to
that choice.
In addition, environmental changes in an individual's life
may have relevance to the ability to give or withhold consent. An
individual whose decisional abilities were previously impaired because of the coerciveness of the environment in which he or she
lived may find those abilities improved with change to a new and
freer environment. But typically, a "change of scene" alone will
not be sufficient to improve these skills. Often an individual will
need special educational or habilitative assistance to learn how to
function effectively in the less restrictive environment.
With this brief sketch of common characteristics in mind, we
turn to the legal contexts in which consent issues arise in the lives
of people with mental retardation.
II.

CONSENT ISSUES IN THE LIVES OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
RETARDATION

A.

Analogies to Minors and to Adults with Mental Illness

The legal doctrine of consent has developed in general medical cases, and the variations of that doctrine involving mental disability have often involved minors or people with mental illness.
The particular nature of mental retardation, and the consent issues that arise in the lives of people with that disability, require a
reconsideration of the applicability of rules developed in different
settings.
The general rules of tort law have typically involved the con24. AAMR 1992 CLASSIFICATION, supra note 6, at 18.
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sent of the patient as an asserted defense in a battery action
against the physician, most frequently, a surgeon. 25 These are
cases in which the courts typically can assume that the patient was
mentally capable of making decisions regarding medical care, and
was free of extraordinary coercion or duress in the making of that
decision. 2 6 This has meant that the cases focus most extensively
on the level of information that the physician must provide to the
patient. 2 7 This emphasis is reflected in the common reference in
28
medical circles to "informed consent."
Variations from this model of legal consent have most frequently involved minors and persons with mental illness. Many
of the leading cases involving the possible lack of mental capacity
to make medical decisions have involved children. 29 Some of
these cases have decided when the consent of a parent is required,3 0 while others have dealt with the standard to be em3
ployed by adult substitute decisionmakers on behalf of children. '
The other leading cases that vary from the surgery patient model
involve adults with mental illness. These cases most frequently
involve mental patients who attempt to refuse consent to some
32
form of treatment.
Although there are some useful parallels between adults with
mental illness and children on the one hand and people with
mental retardation on the other, there are limitations to the analogies as well. For example, the cases involving children often
presuppose the minor's incapacity to give or withhold consent
based on age alone, rather than requiring an inquiry into individual ability.3 3 By contrast, it is not possible to determine whether
25. See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905).
26. A leading text, for example, asserts that "[rielatively few cases have
dealt with the problem of consent given under duress. Duress is an important
defense in the criminal law, and will justify rescission of a contract or other
transaction, with restitution, but there has been no discussion of its place in the
law of torts."

W.

PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF

TORTS 121 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].

27. See, e.g., RozovsKY, supra note 20, at 44-64 and cases cited therein.
28. See CONSENT HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 6.
29. See generally ANGELA HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE (2d ed. 1985); ROBERT MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD,
FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 455-

591 (2d ed. 1989).
30. See, e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (holding surgeon liable for battery where he operated on minor without parent's consent).
31. See, e.g., Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
32. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 213 (1990); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
33. See, e.g., In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765 (Wash. 1942). But cf Bellotti v.
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an individual is capable of giving or withholding consent based
solely on whether or not the person has mental retardation, or by
considering an IQ score. 34 Additionally, almost all minors have
parents who are available to serve as substitute decisionmakers.
Most adults with mental retardation do not have guardians appointed for them, and unless they are appointed as guardians,
their parents have no legal authority to make decisions on their
35
behalf.
Relevant differences also exist between mental retardation
and mental illness. Since mental illness is often episodic or cyclical in its manifestations, it may be possible to seek guidance from
an individual's previous preferences in determining what he or
she would do during a period of competence.3 6 Although people
with mental retardation are capable of gaining (or losing) skills
over time, the level of an individual's underlying intellectual impairment does not change appreciably. As a result, it will seldom
be possible to refer to an individual's preferences as expressed
37
during a previous period of greater decisional capacity.
More significantly, consent cases involving mental illness
most frequently focus on an individual who actively opposes a
proposed course of treatment. 38 As a result, the legal dispute
centers around whether there is a sufficient justification for overriding the patient's articulated preferences. Such cases also arise
that involve people with mental retardation, but more frequently
in mental retardation cases, the preference of the disabled individual is not known, and often has not been sought. As a result,
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (requiring individualized assessment of minor's ability to
consent to abortion), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979).
34. See Lindsey & Luckasson, supra note 7.
35. See generally Milton Blackstone, Before I'm Gone: A Parent'sPerspective, in A
NEW LOOK AT GUARDIANSHIP: PROTECTIVE SERVICES THAT SUPPORT PERSONALIZED

LIVING 61-73 (Tony Apolloni & Thomas Cooke eds., 1984).
36. See generally Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (Mass. App. Ct.
1978). Incapacity caused by injury or trauma to a previously competent person
may also permit inquiry into the individual's past preferences or statements of
intent. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284
(1990) (concluding that state may require clear and convincing evidence of incompetents's previous wishes concerning withdrawal of life support treatment);
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J.) (holding individual's past preferences are
controlling if sufficiently probative; affirming individual's rights to choice and
privacy), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
37. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417
(Mass. 1977) (speculating as to what individual with profound mental retardation would prefer if competent and capable of considering effect of his
incompetence).
38. For a discussion of cases involving mentally ill individuals who have refused consent to treatment, see infra notes 45-47.
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mental retardation cases have more frequently involved balancing
what is perceived by others to be the individual's stake in the outcome against the state's interest, rather than considering the individual's interest in making his or her own choice.3 9
B.

Consent Issues in the Lives of People with Mental Retardation

The nature of mental retardation as a disability and the status
of adults with mental retardation in society combine to shape consent issues in a unique way. Unlike mentally typical adults, it cannot be assumed that mentally retarded adults understand the
standard explanations of ordinary procedures or activities, nor
can it be assumed that they have chosen to acquiesce in a proposal merely because they do not voice an objection. 40 Unlike minors, adults with mental retardation cannot be assumed, because
of their status, automatically to be incompetent (or competent) to
make their own decisions. If there is doubt about particular individuals' capacity to consent, they cannot be presumed to have a
legally authorized surrogate decisionmaker in place. Nor can it
be assumed that adults with mental retardation will eventually become competent through the passage of time, thus allowing postponement of some decisions for the duration of their
incompetence.
There are also relevant differences between mental illness
and mental retardation. Unlike adults with mental illness, any
possible legal impairment of decisionmaking capacity in individuals with mental retardation is likely to result from failure to com41
prehend what is proposed or inability to communicate a choice,
39. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1983) (failing to discuss
what Nicholas Romeo's preferences might have been with respect to conditions
of his involuntary confinement in Pennsylvania mental institution); see also Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
40. As a practical matter, the degree of formality in assuring consent from
mentally typical adults varies with the complexity and severity of the procedure.
For example, medical care providers would certainly document their efforts to
assure adequate consent before performing major surgery, but would be unlikely to do so before applying a Band-Aid. Omission of the formalities of consent in the latter case reflects both the minimal level of risk (both medical and
legal) and the assumption that the individual's "consent" is sufficiently indicated
by his or her failure to object.
41. In a smaller percentage of cases, the incapacity of a person with mental
illness may similarly derive from failure to understand or inability to articulate a
choice. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132-33 (1990) (holding that
individual who was unable to give express consent was legally unable to agree to
voluntary confinement). It should also be noted that mental illness and mental
retardation are not mutually exclusive conditions; some individuals may have

both disabilities. See generally JACK A.

STARK ET AL., MENTAL RETARDATION AND
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rather than society's concern that their disability might lead them
to irrational choices.
The potential incompetence of particular individuals with
mental retardation to make decisions is also more likely to be disguised than in cases of mental illness. Individuals who have
mental retardation often attempt to mask their disability and
"pass" as mentally typical. 4 2 The phenomenon of denial of disability 43 is likely to matter in cases of the provision of generic services, where most clients are mentally typical (such as those who
visit a dentist), and not in cases where the service delivery system
is directed toward people with disabilities (such as a group home).
C.

Settings in Which Consent Issues Arise for People with Mental
Retardation

For people with mental illness, the vast majority of consent
cases involve attempts to refuse treatments designed to address
direct consequences of their mental illness. 44 Most prominent
45
among these are possible refusal of consent to psychosurgery,
electroconvulsive therapy 46 and psychotropic medications. 4 7 Also
within this category, although typically addressed in different
MENTAL HEALTH:

CLASSIFICATION, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT,

SERVICES

315-80

(1988).
42. Some forms of mental retardation, of course, involve distinctive visible
physical characteristics. A well known example is Down's Syndrome. But more
frequently, mental retardation is unaccompanied by any identifiable physical
attributes.
43. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
44. See PERLIN, supra note 20, at 217-438.
45. See Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434A.W. (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne Cty. July 10, 1973) (holding that involuntarily detained mental patient cannot consent to experimental psychosurgery), reprinted

in 2 Prison L. Rptr. 433 (1973). See generally ELLIOT VALENSTEIN,

GREAT AND DES-

PERATE CURES: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF PSYCHOSURGERY AND OTHER RADICAL
TREATMENTS FOR MENTAL ILLNESS (1986); DAVID WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH LAW:

MAJOR ISSUES

193-212

(1981); THE PSYCHOSURGERY DEBATE: SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL,

(Elliot Valenstein ed., 1980).
46. See, e.g., Aden v. Younger, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 550-51 (Ct. App. 1976);
Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 913 (Minn. 1976); William Winslade et al.,
Medical,Judicial,and Statutory Regulation of ECT in the United States, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1347 (1984).
47. See, e.g., Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986). For a discussion of
incompetent's right to refuse treatment, see Alexander D. Brooks, The Right to
Refuse Antipsychotic Medications: Law and Policy, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 339 (1987);
Robert Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 461 (1977); Robert L. Sprague & Gladys B. Baxley, Drugs
for Behavior Management, with Comments on Some Legal Aspects, in 10 MENTAL RETARDATION & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 92 (Joseph Wortis ed., 1978).
AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES
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terms, are civil commitment and voluntary admission to residential treatment facilities. 48 Much less frequent are litigated cases in
which mental illness is considered in the context of nonpsychia49
tric treatments or other activities.
Individuals with mental retardation present consent issues in
a wide variety of settings. Almost any residential setting raises
questions of the adequacy of, or alternatives to, an individual's
consent. Most obvious are commitment or admission to large
congregate facilities often described as institutions. 50 Less obvious are placements in group homes and other community residential programs. 5' Although these settings do not involve the
"massive curtailment of liberty" 5 2 of total institutions, they affect
significant liberty interests nonetheless. 53 Decisions about where
a person will live, and with whom, involve a degree of coercion
and intrusiveness that have no parallels in the lives of nondis48. Civil commitment can be thought of as surrogate decisionmaking by the
judge without inquiry into the individual's capacity to make decisions, unless
incompetence is part of the substantive criteria for commitment in a particular
state. Voluntary admission clearly involves the full range of consent issues, but
is seldom litigated because of the tendency of mental health facilities and professionals to accept any apparent acquiescence in institutionalization. See Grace
Olin & Harry Olin, Informed Consent in Voluntary Mental Hospital Admissions, 132
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 938 (1975) (noting that few "voluntary" patients possessed
adequate information); Howard Owens, When is Voluntary Commitment Really Voluntary?, 47 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 104 (1977) (indicating that many "voluntary" admission forms that had been accepted as legally adequate were
inconsistent with either understanding or acquiescence). See generally 1 MENTAL
DISABILITY LAw, supra note 20, at 407-13; Janet Gilboy &John Schmidt, "Voluntary" Hospitalizationof the Mentally Ill,
66 Nw. U. L. REV. 429 (1971).
49. See, e.g., In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 261 (Ohio 1987) (holding that state
could not compel legally competent individual to undergo medical treatment
even though she suffered from long-standing religious delusions). See generally
RoZOFSKY,supra note 20, at 430-36 (discussing right to refuse treatment in emergency situations).
50. See, e.g., People v. Reliford, 382 N.E.2d 72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); In re
Harhut, 385 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1986). See generally Gunnar Dybwad & Stanley
S. Herr, Unnecessary Coercion: An End to Involuntary Civil Commitment of Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REV. 753 (1979).
51. For a discussion of how the judiciary monitors the residential placement
of mentally retarded individuals in the District of Columbia, seeJ. Dennis Doyle,
Court Proceduresfor Placements in Community Living Facilities, 24 MENTAL RETARDATION 311 (1986).
52. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
53. See James W. Ellis, Right to Developmental Disabilities Services Act, in DIsABLED PERSONS AND THE LAw: STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 409, 440 (Bruce Sales et
al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter Ellis, Services Act] (requiring more formalized procedure for residential services because such services involve greater loss of
liberty).
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abled individuals who are not incarcerated. 54
Nonresidential programs also involve choices that require attention to the adequacy of consent. 55 Whether they take the form
of participation in an adult habilitation program, enrollment as a
worker or trainee in a sheltered workshop, or some other program, the individual faces a choice with significant potential advantages and drawbacks to be considered. Similarly, provision of
medical services unrelated to the individual's disability require
consent by the individual or someone who is authorized to make
decisions on his or her behalf. For example, although psychotropic medications do not address the disabilities caused by
mental retardation, many individuals who have mental retardation are given these medications, either for administrative convenience or to address an individual's coexisting mental illness. 56
In addition, people with mental retardation may be sought as subjects in programs of behavior modification or experimentation. 57
Substantial attention has been directed to consent issues that
involve procedures related to sexuality and procreation on the
part of people with mental retardation.5 8 The most prominent
issue, especially in the first half of this century, has been involuntary sterilization. 59 Increasing attention has also been directed to
54. For a striking example of coercion and intrusion into the lives of persons with mental retardation, see infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
55. Ellis, Services Act, supra note 53, at 438-40.
56. For a discussion of non-therapeutic administration of drugs to persons
with mental retardation, see Robert Plotkin & Kay Rigling Gill, Invisible Manacles:
Drugging Mentally Retarded People, 31 STAN. L. REV. 637 (1979).
57. See NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BiOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH INVOLVING THOSE INSTITUTIONALIZED AS MENTALLY INFIRM (1978)

(reporting results of comprehensive study on consent procedure applicable to
mentally retarded individuals in various institutions); Paul R. Friedman, Legal
Regulation of Applied Behavior Analysis in Mental Institutions and Prisons, 17 ARIZ. L.
REV. 39 (1975).
58. See generally BLATr, supra note 1, at 245-48; HUMAN SEXUALITY AND THE
MENTALLY RETARDED

(Felix F. de la Cruz & G. LaVeck eds., 1973).

59. The case which authorized the epidemic of involuntary sterilization of
mentally retarded persons in the first half of this century was Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200 (1927). More recent cases have made involuntary sterilizations more
difficult to obtain. See, e.g., North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North
Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (requiring that court order be obtained before parents could have child involuntarily sterilized and concluding
that parents must demonstrate clear and convincing need for such procedures);
In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981) (holding that parents must obtain court
order and further holding that sterilization of minor may be performed only
when "medically essential"); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1981) (holding it
appropriate for court to decide whether parents can have daughter involuntarily
sterilized in her best interests given that daughter had Down's Syndrome); In re
Hayes, 608 P.2d 635 (Wash. 1980) (holding that minor's parents need court's

1992]

DECISIONS BY PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION

1795

the issue of abortion of the pregnancies of women with mental
retardation. 60 Similarly complex questions surround the prescription of contraceptives for individuals with mental retardation
who may lack the capacity to give or withhold consent.
A growing number of cases have begun to address the issue
of withholding life-saving or life-sustaining treatment from individuals with mental retardation who may be terminally ill.61 The
United States Supreme Court has recognized a liberty interest in
being free from unwanted treatment, 62 and courts will have to address how this right is to be implemented for individuals with
63
mental retardation.
In each of these varied situations, similar consent questions
must be addressed. At the outset, it must be determined whether
the individual with mental retardation possesses the ability to
make the decision. If the person lacks that capacity, the issue becomes who will make the decision on that person's behalf,6 4 and
what standard the decisionmaker will be asked to employ.
III.

GENERAL DOCTRINES OF CONSENT

A.

Tort Law

The structure of the law of consent begins from the framework that consent forms a defense to the tort of battery. A physician (or anyone else) who is guilty of an offensive touching has
authorization before sterilizating child without her consent). For further discussion of involuntary sterilization, see generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of
Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE L.J.
806.
60. See generally Monroe Price & Robert Burt, NonconsensualMedical Procedures
and the Right to Privacy, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 93-114

(Michael Kindred et al. eds., 1976).
61. See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert. denied, Storar v. Storar,
454 U.S. 858 (1981); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417 (Mass. 1977).
62. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
63. Although Cruzan involved a person who had become incompetent because of degeneration into a persistent vegetative state, the focus was on the
adequacy of the evidence of what Ms. Cruzan had indicated about her preferences while she was still competent. As a result, the Supreme Court's decision
does not resolve the issue of an individual who may never have been competent
to make his or her own decisions.
64. Some decisions, because of their uniquely personal character, will not
be amenable to decisions by surrogates if the individuals with mental retardation
lack the capacity to choose for themselves. For example, it is intuitively obvious
that a guardian (or a court) will not be authorized to select a marriage partner
for an incompetent person. Similarly, all would agree that a guardian is not
authorized to vote on behalf of his ward in a public election.
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committed a tortious battery, but when that touching is at the patient's request, or with his or her acquiescence, no tort has been
committed. 6 5 As the Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he informed
consent doctrine has become firmly entrenched in American tort
66
law."
The general rules of consent require that an individual be
competent to give or withhold assent to a particular proposal.
This requirement of competence is an attempt to assure that
treatment providers and others do not take advantage of individuals who lack the requisite level of capacity. The essence of the
rule is to respect the autonomy of those deemed competent by
allowing them to make their own choices, while protecting incompetent persons from decisions that are actually made by others
that may not be in the individual's best interest.
The tort law definition of competence reflects these purposes. Traditionally, competence has been recognized as requir67
ing three elements: capacity, information and voluntariness.
Thus, legally adequate consent requires that the individual be
able to understand what is proposed, have sufficient knowledge
about the proposal and its alternatives, and be able to make a free
choice. Each of these elements is designed to promote the policy
goals of protecting individuals who cannot make their own
choices.
The requirement of capacity is central to the definition; it requires that an individual have the mental capacity to process the
information involved in making a choice. If a proposal is beyond
an individual's ability to comprehend, any assertion of acquiescence will be treated as a nullity. Similarly, if a person who does
not understand what is proposed purports to object to it, the law
has traditionally disregarded the refusal.
The information component of the definition reflects the
65. Some authorities view consent as negating an element of the tort,
rather than constituting a defense. The formulation of this view would treat
battery as an unconsented touching. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 26, at
112. These two formulations of the role of consent have no practical consequences for the resolution of consent cases discussed in this Article.
66. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
The issue before the Court in Cruzan was whether the guardians of a patient,
who was in a persistent vegetative state, had the right to terminate life support.
The Court recognized that the notion of bodily intergrity has become firmly entrenched in consent law and concluded that "[e]very human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his [or her]
own body ......
Id. (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105
N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914)).

67. See generally CONSENT

HANDBOOK,

supra note 19, at 6-13.
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judgment that a theoretical ability to understand a proposal is insufficient. Actual understanding requires a mastery of the facts
relevant to making a rational choice. For example, a patient who
is capable of understanding a proposed operation, but who has
not been informed that there are chances of adverse consequences will not be held to have given adequate consent. There
has been substantial debate in recent years about how much information must be provided, and whether the measure of adequacy is what a reasonable doctor would disclose or what a
reasonable patient would want to know. 68 But all parties to this
debate agree that a person who is uninformed-by whatever definition is adopted-cannot be said to have given legally adequate
consent.
The third element of consent requires that the purported
agreement of the individual actually reflect his or her own choice
and will. This insistence on the individual's volition may be
thought of as analogous to the criminal law's defense of duress:
the law will not attribute to a person actions that the person did
not voluntarily choose to take. 6 9 In the context of consent, the
issue most frequently involves the possibility of excessive influence rather than direct threats or physical coercion.
B.

Constitutional Doctrine.

For years, courts and commentators have explored the contention that the common law doctrine of consent has constitutional proportions when state action is involved. 70 Despite earlier
opportunities, 7 1 the United States Supreme Court did not directly
68. Compare Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972) with Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960). For a discussion of informed consent and physicians' obligations, see generally BARRY R.
FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 321-48 (2d ed.
1991); Alan Meisel, Toward a Model of the Legal Doctrine of Informed Consent, 134
AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 285 (1977); Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent
to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279 (1977); Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W.
Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 628 (1970).
69. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 26, at 121; cf WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN
W. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 432-41 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing criminal law defense
of duress).
70. For discussion of the initial cases in this area, see Friedman, supra note
57, at 56-75.
71. For example, the Supreme Court could have addressed the constitutional implications of consent law in Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). In
Mills, the Court addressed claims brought by six individuals who were forced to
take anti-psychotic drugs while in mental institutions. Id. at 305. The Court
refrained from reaching the constitutional questions. Id.
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address the possibility of a constitutional dimension to consent
law until three cases decided in 1990.
In Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Department of Health,72 the Court
decided that under the Due Process Clauses, "a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment." 73 But the Cruzan case involved a
proposal to withdraw life-sustaining nutrition and hydration from
an individual who was in a persistent vegetative state, and thus, by
any definition, incompetent to make her own decisions. The
party seeking to have the treatment withheld argued that the right
of incompetent persons should be held parallel to those of competent individuals who can make their own decisions. The majority rejected the contention that this conclusion was compelled by
75
its previous decisions in Parham v. J.R.7 4 and Youngberg v. Romeo,
but declined to rule directly on what the scope of an incompetent
76
person's consent rights might be.
In Washington v. Harper,77 the Justices confronted the issue of
the right of prisoners to refuse unwanted psychotropic medication. After noting that state law had conferred on the prisoner "a
right to be free from the arbitrary administration of antipsychotic
medication," 78 the Court concluded that even in the absence of
that state-created right, Harper would have "a significant liberty
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic
drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 79 The Justices then proceeded to uphold the Washington
regulation against both substantive and procedural due process
challenges.
On the substantive due process issue, the Harper Court held
that state authorities could medicate a prisoner without his con72. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
73. Id.
74. 442 U.S. 584, 606 (1979). In Parham, the Court held that Georgia's procedures for admitting children to state mental hospitals were constitutional because the procedures neither unduly burdened the state nor unduly inhibited
parental consent. Id. The Court also recognized that "a child ... has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment."
Id. at 600.
75. 457 U.S. 307, 320-22 (1982).
76. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279-80; see also id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("I also write separately to emphasize that the Court does not today decide the
issue whether a State must also give effect to the decisions of a surrogate
decisionmaker.").
77. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
78. Id. at 221.
79. Id.
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sent if it were determined that he had "a serious mental illness"
and that the inmate was "dangerous to himself or others and the
treatment [was] in the inmate's medical interest." 80 Addressing
the procedural due process issues, the majority approved adjudication by an "independent" decisionmaker who was not a judge,
and denied a claim that the decisionmaker was obligated to employ a standard of proof higher than preponderance of the
evidence. 8 '
The applicability of the Harper holding in contexts and settings other than prisons is unclear, since the Court emphasized
"the legitimacy, and the necessity of considering the State's interests in prison safety and security." 8 2 Caution about extending the
Court's ruling to non-prison settings is also emphasized by the
83
majority's citation to other prison cases, such as Turner v. Safley
and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz.8 4 As the Court noted, "the extent
of a prisoner's right under the [Due Process] Clause to avoid the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs- must be defined
in the context of the inmate's confinement."8 5 This limitation is
particularly significant with regard to the Court's rejection in
Harper of the claim that the state should have to demonstrate that
the forced medication was consistent with the least-drastic-means
principle.8 6 Both Turner and Estate of Shabazz involved rights (correspondence and free exercise of religion, respectively) that
would have triggered strict scrutiny and the least-drastic-means
test had they arisen in a non-prison setting.
The third relevant decision in 1990 was Zinermon v. Burch, 87 in
which the Court held that it was sufficient to state a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a patient to allege that the state had admitted him as a "voluntary" patient in a mental hospital when they
had reason to know that he was not mentally competent to make a
voluntary decision to enter the facility. 8 8 The Court explicitly de80. Id.at 227.
81. Id. at 228-36.
82. Id. at 233.
83. 482 U.S. 78, 88-91 (1987).
84. 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).
85. Harper, 494 U.S. at 222.
86. Id. at 224-25. In Harper, the Court concluded that an absence of alternatives constitutes evidence of a regulation's reasonableness. However, the
Court stated that "[tihis does not mean that prison officials 'have to set up and
then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the
claimant's constitutional complaint.' " Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91).
87. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
88. Id. at 137-39.
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clined to rule on whether Burch could raise a substantive due process claim of unlawful detention. 89 Instead, the majority limited
its examination to the procedural due process claim and concluded that an individual who lacked the capacity to consent could
not be deprived of a hearing on the issue of whether he should be
confined in a mental institution.
The Zinermon decision contains commentary on the special
consent issues presented by people with substantial mental illness. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion observed:
Indeed, the very nature of mental illness makes it foreseeable that a person needing mental health care will be
unable to understand any proffered "explanation and
disclosure of the subject matter" of the forms that person is asked to sign, and will be unable "to make a knowing and willful decision" whether to consent to
admission. 90
The Court elaborated on this point in a footnote:
The characteristics of mental illness thus create special
problems regarding informed consent. Even if the State
usually might be justified in taking at face value a person's request for admission to a hospital for medical
treatment, it may not be justified in doing so, without
further inquiry, as to a mentally ill person's request for
admission and treatment at a mental hospital. 9 1
Thus the Court refused to allow a state to accept as valid a consent document signed by an individual known or strongly sus92
pected to be incompetent.
89. Id. at 126-27 (noting that substantive due process issue was not raised
in petition for certiorari). However, the Zinermon Court did hold that Burch's
complaint stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Id. at 139. Section
1983 provides:
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
90. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 133 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.455(22) (West
1981)).
91. Id. at 133 n.18.
92. Id. The Court also rejected the possibility that failure to obtain legally
adequate consent would be the equivalent of "harmless error" on the theory
that such a person would certainly have been confined if involuntary commitment had been sought. The Court stated:

1992]

DECISIONS BY PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION

1801

Taken together, these three decisions resolve some constitutional questions about consent and leave others unanswered.
Cruzan makes clear that the common law doctrine of consent has
constitutional proportions, and that competent individuals have a
substantive due process right to be free from at least some forms
of unwanted treatment. Harperteaches that individuals have a liberty interest in being free from unwanted psychotropic medications, but that under some circumstances the state may have a
sufficient interest in medicating the individual over his objections.
Zinermon warns that imposing treatment on an individual under
the guise of accepting his consent will raise due process concerns
when there was reason to anticipate that his mental condition rendered him incapable of making his own legally valid choice.
There are also important constitutional questions that remain unresolved. The Court has not specified the level or "tier"
of substantive due process analysis to be employed in deciding
when the state may overcome a competent patient's objections to
treatment outside a prison setting. Thus it remains uncertain
whether the state must demonstrate a compelling interest in overcoming a patient's choice to decline treatment, and whether the
state must demonstrate that it had no less drastic means available
to accomplish its purpose. Similarly, the Court has not provided
a constitutional definition of when an individual is incapable of
making his or her own decisions about treatment, nor has it announced what kind of hearing is required to determine incompetence or overcome the objections of a competent person. The
Court has also declined to decide under what circumstances providing treatment without obtaining adequate consent will constitute a violation of substantive due process. 93
Persons who are mentally ill and incapable of giving informed consent
to admission would not necessarily meet the statutory standard for involuntary placement, which requires either that they are likely to injure
themselves or others, or that their neglect or refusal to care for themselves threatens their well-being ....

The involuntary placement pro-

cess serves to guard against the confinement of a person who, though
mentally ill, is harmless and can survive safely outside an institution.
Confinement of such a person not only violates Florida law, but also is
unconstitutional.
Id. (quoting O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)).

93. This inquiry is analogous, however, to the Court's inquiry in O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). In O'Connor, the Court held that confining a
nondangerous individual in custodial confinement that provided no treatment
deprived him of liberty in violation of the substantive meaning of the due process clause. Id. at 575.
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APPLYING CONSENT DOCTRINES TO MENTAL RETARDATION

ISSUES

A.

The Context

As noted earlier, consent issues in the lives of people with
mental retardation will be shaped largely by cases that involved
individuals with other kinds of disabilities or no disability at all.
Yet these decisions, for the most part, provide useful guidance for
the resolution of mental retardation cases.
It is well established that some individuals with mental retardation will be competent to make important decisions concerning
their lives and that others will not. It is also clear that for a particular individual, some proposed treatments or activities will be
within his or her capacity to give or withhold consent and that
others will not. Although we know that these variations in decisional capacity exist among the population of people who have
mental retardation, in many cases it will not be clear whether a
particular individual is capable of making a particular decision.
To understand how these varying capacities work in the lives
of people with mental retardation, it is essential to understand
how coercive the atmosphere is in which many, if not most, of
them live. The most obvious element of this phenomenon is authorized, official coercion, such as the powers of a court-appointed guardian or the authority of a facility's staff over civilly
committed individuals. But the reality of the lives of people with
mental retardation involves a more pervasive coerciveness. A
wide variety of nondisabled individuals, including social workers,
therapists, operators of sheltered workshops and group homes,
and others will often assume and exercise decisionmaking authority over people with mental retardation in ways that are not described in, or authorized by the law. People with mental
retardation often believe, accurately for the most part, that, as a
practical matter, they must obtain "permission" from nondisabled individuals to do things that no other adults in society must
obtain permission to do. Both people with mental retardation
and nondisabled individuals who deal with them on a regular basis assume that such authority is natural, necessary and
94
appropriate.
An example that suggests the nature of this reality in the lives
94. The rarity of such coerciveness in the lives of nondisabled individuals
and its pervasiveness in the lives of people with mental disabilities may be sug-

gested by contemplating the type of control that a parole officer exercises over
criminal parolees.
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of people with mental retardation can be found in a memo issued
in 1967 to individuals who were about to be released from a state
mental retardation institution:
We congratulate you on being given this chance to
take your place in society. During this period you will be
on probation and you must not only obey all of the laws
of your community, but also the following rules of our
School:
1. You must not leave your present place without
first notifying us.
2. You must not drive or own a car.
3. You must not drink alcoholic beverages or enter
any tavern.
4. You must not get married.
5. You must not get engaged, go steady, or date.
6. You must not make any written contract in regard
to purchase of articles on time payments without first
talking to your social worker. See worker before using
"lay-a-way" plan.
7. You must be home by 12:00 A.M., earlier if requested by employer or other person in charge.
8. You must not leave the state.
Carry this reminder with you at all times and read it frequently. Violation of any one of the above rules may result in your return to the school.
95
Superintendent, Lincoln State School
The range of intentionally chilling effects on the financial, familial, social, mobility and almost every other aspect of an individual's life and liberty is truly Orwellian. The authors who
uncovered this haunting example of pervasive intrusiveness and
coercion also ask us to speculate whether there are still individuals with mental retardation released in 1967 who are still carrying
around this "reminder" and still "reading it frequently" a quarter
96
of a century later.
95. Cathy Ficker-Terrill & Louis Rowitz, Choices, 29 MENTAL RETARDATION

63 (1991).
96. Id. at 64. Although the specificity of this memo is startling, there is
reason to believe that, in a way, its explicit warnings may be superfluous. The
pervasiveness of informal (and essentially lawless) controls, the necessity of obtaining permission from officials such as social workers for everyday activities,
and the ubiquitous threat of being "sent back" are unambiguously perceived by
many individuals living in the community.
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Thus in shaping the consent rules to be applied in cases involving mental retardation, we have the confluence of three significant phenomena: substantial mental and communication
disabilities that may not be apparent to outsiders, a uniquely coercive environment in the lives of many of these individuals, and
the fact that many of the decisions involve possible deprivation of
fundamental rights. It is against this background that the constitutional and common law doctrines must be analyzed.
A principal problem in the lives of people with mental retardation is the extent to which they have been denied the right to
make important decisions affecting their own lives. In some circumstances, the law has allowed others to make these decisions
for them. But in many other cases, authorizing others to make
the decisions has reflected a desire to shape their lives in ways
that are convenient to society. 9 7 In reshaping the doctrine of consent for people with mental retardation, it is essential to permit
individuals who can make their own decisions to do so. An
equally important goal must be to protect those individuals who
cannot make their own decisions from unwarranted deprivation
of their substantive liberties.
B.

Autonomous Decisions

The implementation of the rules of consent for people with
mental retardation must first reflect the importance of letting individuals make as many decisions about their own lives as possible. There are several practical ways of pursuing this goal.
The first is to recognize that people with mental retardation
have substantial liberty interests that merit full legal protection.
In the terminology of constitutional law, this involves both substantive and procedural due process. For example, in contexts
other than mental retardation, the United States Supreme Court
has recognized procreation,9 8 contraception,9 9 and freedom from
97. See STANLEY S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE 936 (1983); R.C. SCHEERENBERGER, A HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION (1983);
PETER L. TYOR AND L. BELL, CARING FOR THE RETARDED IN AMERICA: A HISTORY
(1984); WOLF WOLFENSBERGER, THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF OUR INSTITUTIONAL
MODELS (1975).

98. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 537 (1942)
(reasoning that Oklahoma statute deprived claimant of fundamental right and
invalidating statute where such statute permitted court ordered sterilization of
"habitual criminal").
99. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating as unconstitutional statute prohibiting contraception).
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physical confinement 0 0° as fundamental rights. Under the substantive meaning of due process, to deprive an individual of these
rights, the government must demonstrate a compelling interest
and prove that no alternative means were available that involved
less deprivation of liberty. Similarly, the Supreme Court has recognized substantial liberty interests in being free from unwanted
medical treatment,' 0 ' and to custody and control of the upbringing of one's children. 10 2 Too frequently in mental disability
cases, the tendency has been to exaggerate the state's interest or
10 3
to minimize the liberty interest of the individual.
Second, it is equally important to enhance the ability of individuals with mental retardation to make their own decisions. This
effort must take several forms. One is to make decisionmaking a
major element in special education curricula. 0 4 Another is to implement habilitation programs for adults that identify difficulties
in making decisions and that seek to address and remedy those
problems. 0 5 A substantial argument can be made that in some
settings, such habilitation is constitutionally mandated under substantive due process doctrine through its connection to other im06
portant constitutional rights.'
A third approach would be to implement the recognition that
competence to make decisions is not an all-or-nothing phenome100. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
101. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990).
102. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
103. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) ("One who is
suffering from a debilitating mental illness and in need of treatment is neither
wholly at liberty nor free of stigma."); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) ("It
would be strange if [the public] could not call upon those who already sap the
strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those
concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetency."). The
devaluation sometimes takes the form of doctrinal formulation, as in the cases
just cited, but it may also manifest itself through interpretation of the facts of a
particular case. For example, in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317
(1982), the Court began from the assumed fact that "in light of the severe character of his retardation, . . . no amount of training will make possible his release." As it happens, this factual premise proved to be untrue, and Nicholas
Romeo adapted well to life in the community following his release from Pennhurst State School and Hospital. See John Woestendiek, The Deinstitutionalization
of.Vicholas Romeo, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 27, 1984, (Magazine), at 18;
see also Stephen J. Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 331
(1985).
104. See DEBORAH SMITH & RUTH LuCKASSON, INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL
EDUCATION: TEACHING IN AN AGE OF CHALLENGE 144, 153-54 (1992).
105. See Lindsey & Luckasson, supra note 7.

106. Cf Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (linking right of habilitation to substantive rights of safety and freedom from restraint).
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non, but rather varies with the complexity and importance of the
subject matter of the proposed decision. The need for limited
purpose guardianships has been recognized for a quarter of a
century,' 0 7 but states have been painfully slow in implementing
this principle. It may be necessary to pursue the possibility of
constitutional litigation against the practice of automatically ordering plenary guardianships in all cases in a particular
jurisdiction.' 0 8
Finally, governments must work to eliminate the problem of
false alternatives. By declining to create alternatives to institutional placements in sufficient numbers, 0 9 states have created an
artificial scarcity of the kind of environments most likely to enhance the full enjoyment of liberty by individuals with mental retardation. This scarcity creates a "take it or leave it" environment
that pushes many individuals into settings more restrictive than
their habilitation needs require. Addressing this problem will involve reforming the formula by which the Federal government reimburses states for expenditures under the Medicaid program.1 0
It may also be possible to provide some relief through constitutional litigation implementing the Supreme Court's decision in
Romeo. I I
But any attempted constitutional remedy to consent issues
involving people with mental retardation will be limited in its effectiveness if courts contrive excuses for deferring to state government officials. In Romeo, this deferral was described in terms
107. MELVIN T. AXILBUND, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON THE MENTALLY
DISABLED, EXERCISING JUDGMENT FOR THE DISABLED (Exec. Summary 1979);
PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
LAw 25 (1963); Michael Kindred, Guardianship and Limitations Upon Capacity, in

62-92 (Michael Kindred et al.
eds., 1976); Note, Limited Guardianshipfor the Mentally Retarded, 8 N.M. L. REV.
231 (1978).
108. This might be an issue particularly appropriate for litigation under
state constitutions. See generally Michael L. Perlin, State Constitutionsand Statutes as
Sources of Rights for the Mentally Disabled: The Last Frontier?, 20 Lov. L.A. L. REV.
1249, 1279-94 (1987).
109. See generally DAVID BRADDOCK ET AL., THE STATE OF THE STATES IN DETHE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW

VELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES (1990).

110. An increasing portion of the cost of state institutions is being paid by
the federal government. In 1988, more than half the states relied on federal
funding to pay at least 50% of the costs of running their mental retardation
institutions, and all but two states used federal funding to pay for at least 25% of

the cost.

BRADDOCK ET AL.,

supra note 109, at 10.

111. See, e.g., Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962
(1986); Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124,
and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869 (1986); Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training
Sch., 757 F. Supp. 1231 (D.N.M. 1990).
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of deference to professional expertise, and two justifications were
offered. The first was judicial agnosticism-the assertion that
courts are no "better qualified than appropriate professionals in
making such decisions. 112 But courts are not required-or indeed permitted-to select and implement the professional opinion that represents the consensus within the relevant profession.
Instead, the courts are required to defer to the judgment of the
state official unless it "is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the
decision on such a judgment."' l s Thus the reason for the deference is not because the judgment is made by a professional, but
rather is because it is made by a professional chosen by the state
-

a state official.

This reading of Romeo is consistent with the opinion's other
rationale for deference-that courts should allow state officials to
shape services in the way they choose. "By so limiting judicial
review of challenges to conditions in state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with the internal operations of these
institutions should be minimized."' ' 14 Similar justifications for judicial abdication to the decisions of state officials in the consent
context can be found in Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court
in Harper, referring to "the recognition that prison authorities are
best equipped to make difficult decisions regarding prison
administration." 115
The Court's interest in judicial deference is clear, but it is not
certain whether consent issues outside a prison setting would be
evaluated under Romeo's professional judgment standard or the
more extreme prison test in Harper, which subjects even deprivations of fundamental rights to evaluation under the test of "reasonableness." 16 The setting in which consent issues arise may
influence the courts' approach to people with mental retardation
in group homes, or large institutions, or who are living indepen7
dently in the community."
112. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1982). In Romeo, the
Court concluded that the minimally adequate training that is required by the
Constitution must be reasonable in light of the disabled person's liberty interests. Id. The Court emphasized that, in the future, courts must defer to profes-

sional judgments on the issue of reasonableness. Id.
113. Id. (concluding that professional decisions are presumptively valid).
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223-24 (1990).
Id. at 224-25.
It seems likely that the Court views prisons as sui generis, whose officials

1808

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

C.

[Vol. 37: p. 1779

Protectionfrom Coercion

Just as respect for the choices made by competent individuals
with mental retardation is essential for the protection of their autonomy, preventing the state from accepting fictitious "consent"
from incompetent persons protects them from unwarranted deprivations of their liberty. The constitutional dimensions of this
concern can be found in the Court's opinion in Zinermon.
The concern has special importance for people with mental
retardation. In many service settings, all individuals who have
mental retardation are treated as "voluntary" clients, whose
"consent" is "inferred" from their failure to object.' 18 This situation is closely analogous to the facts of Zinermon, where an individual with mental illness was admitted to a mental hospital despite
the fact that he had appeared "disoriented, semi-mute, confused
and bizarre in appearance and thought" and "appeared to be
paranoid and hallucinating." ' " 9 Confining such an incompetent
person without a hearing or proof of dangerousness to himself or
to others might give rise to claims under both the substantive and
procedural meanings of the due process clause, but the Supreme
20
Court addressed only the procedural aspects.
The Zinermon Court's recognition of the relationship between
mental disability and incompetence has been criticized as imperiling the current system of voluntary admission to mental hospitals.' 2' Whatever validity this criticism may have regarding public
policy for individuals with mental illness, the Court's approach
may prove beneficial in cases involving mental retardation.
are entitled to even greater deference than officials who work in other, less inherently dangerous settings. This speculation is supported by the Harper opinion's observation that the administrators' concerns about medicating prisoners
for the protection of the safety of others
have added weight when a penal institution ... is restricted to inmates
with mental illnesses. Where the inmate's mental disability is the root
cause of the threat he poses to the inmate population, the State's interest in decreasing the danger to others necessarily encompasses an interest in providing him with medical treatment for his illness.
Id. at 225-26. Few consent issues involving people with mental retardation will
present comparable concerns.
118. For an overview of state statutory provisions, see Ellis, Services Act,
supra note 53, at 416-21.
119. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 119 (1990).
120. Id. at 126-27. For a discussion of substantive and procedural due process issues that arise in the consent setting, see supra text accompanying notes
87-92.
121. See Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization:A
TherapeuticJurisprudenceAnalysis of Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY
169, 179 (1991).
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It appears that a majority of persons with mental retardation
who are confined to large residential institutions are there as
"voluntary patients," and indeed some states regard the presence
of all persons in those institutions as "voluntary."'' 2 2 Yet in all
states that still have such institutions, 23 the majority of the institutional population consists of individuals who have severe and
profound mental retardation. It is certain that a large percentage
of these individuals have not validly "consented" to their placement by any process that will bear inspection. In reality, the
states are using the fiction of "voluntariness" for most institutionalized persons with mental retardation to avoid judicial scrutiny
of individual placement decisions. 124 The possibility of liability
under Zinermon may finally assure that such individuals are no
longer warehoused in facilities they have not chosen, with restrictions on their liberty that their disability does not require.
V.

CONCLUSION

People who have mental retardation present unique
problems in the area of consent. Their interest in autonomous
decisionmaking in important areas of their own lives demands
greater respect than the law and service delivery system now offer. Yet at the same time, individuals with mental retardation
need to be protected from deprivations of liberty accomplished
under the ruse of consent, when knowing, voluntary assent was
not truly given, and often was not even sought. True autonomy is
not promoted by pretending that an individual is competent to
make choices that he or she cannot in fact understand.
122. See Ellis, Services Act, supra note 53, at 416-21. See generally Gunnar

Dybwad & Stanley S. Herr, Unnecessary Coercion: An End to Involuntary Civil Commitment of Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REV. 753 (1979).
123. New Hampshire and the District of Columbia have closed their institutions and replaced them with community living arrangements. The trend toward institutional closure is also advancing in other states. See generally
BRADDOCK ET AL., supra note 109, at 14-15.
124. A case that illustrates the way people get "lost" and forgotten in
mental retardation institutions is Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 962 (1986). Ms. Clark was involuntarily committed as a
minor when she was 15 years old. When she reached the age of majority, her
commitment was not reviewed or reexamined. Despite the fact that the law
under which she had been committed had been repealed years earlier, and the
fact that she was not recommitted under the newly enacted statute, her constant
protests that she should be released were ignored for nearly 30 years. The trial
court concluded that the reasons she had been confined for so long, despite
professional judgment that she should be placed in a community living arrangement, were "bureaucratic ineptitude and insufficient allocations of funds to community residence programs." Id. at 86 (quoting Clark v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp.
684, 689 (E.D. Pa. 1985)).

